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SANDBOXES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION:
THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
—Cristina Poncibò* and Laura Zoboli**

Abstract: The paper explores the consumers’ perspective on regulatory sandboxes and their increasing deployment by authorities
in Europe to regulate financial innovation (‘FinTech’) ex ante. In
particular, this article will shed a light on the conditions for regulatory sandboxes to be considered consumer-friendly environments.
To this end, the paper briefly introduces the concept of the regulatory sandbox and discusses it within the framework of consumer
law. Specifically, this study outlines risks and benefits that a regulatory sandbox poses to consumers. Furthermore, the authors provide an analysis of the current European framework and the role
that consumers have taken within the various regulatory sandboxes
that have been recently established. Therefore, the article intends
to contribute to the academic debate on the interplay between technological innovation, new markets and consumer law.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Regulation is widely seen as an obstacle to innovation, especially in the
financial services sector – a fact often cited as a reason for delays in the
adoption of new technologies, or as an argument against regulatory activities
in general. However, from the United Kingdom and, in particular, from the
efforts to regulate their growing financial technology (hereinafter ‘FinTech’)1
Market, there comes a new methodology that – supporters argue – should
ensure consumer protection and mitigate market risks, while encouraging
much-needed innovation.2
According to the FSB these activities can be organized into five categories
of financial services: (a) payments, clearing, and settlement (eg Alipay, PayPal,
blockchain and crypto currencies, infrastructure for derivatives and securities trading and settlement); b) deposits, lending and capital raising (egcrowd
funding; P2P lending); (c) insurance (e.g. mobile and web-based financial services);(d) investment management (e.g. e-trading, robo-advice, digital ID verification); and (e) market support (eg robo advice, smart contracts, big data
analysis).3
Just like our children’s cherished playground, a regulatory sandbox is a
safe area. In these ‘protected regulatory spaces’, innovative financial products
and services are tested and developed, before they are offered on the market.
Importantly, these testing activities involve real market players and consumers,
under close scrutiny from the authorities.4
More precisely, the Financial Stability Board (hereinafter ‘FSB’) notes that:
‘(…) to support the benefits of innovation through shared learning and through
greater access to information on developments, authorities should continue to
improve communication channels with the private sector and to share their
experiences with regulatory sandboxes, accelerators and innovation hubs, as
1

2

3

4

For a definition of the concept, FSB, ‘Financial Stability Implications from FinTech.
Supervisory and Regulatory Issues that Merit Authorities’ 27 June 2017, 7. EBA, Discussion
Paper on the EBA’s Approach to Financial Technology (FinTech) (EBA/DP/2017/02, 4 August
2017) 4-6. EBA, The EBA’s FinTech Roadmap (15 March 2018) 9 <https://www.eba.europa.eu/
documents/10180/1919160/EBA+FinTech+Roadmap.pdf> accessed 4 April 2020.
The different possible approaches – from absent to complete regulation – are discussed by
DA Zetzsche and others, ‘Regulating a Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart
Regulation’ (2017) 23 Fordham J Corp & Fin L 31. For a United States-based perspective, see
also, H.J. Allen, ‘Regulatory Sandboxes’ (2019) 87 George Washington Law Review, 579 fs.
Financial Stability Board (FSB), Implications from FinTech: Supervisory and Regulatory
Issues that Merit Authorities’ Attention, (FSB, 2017) 3 <https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/
uploads/R270617.pdf> accessed 4 April 2020.
W-G Ringe and C. Ruof, A Regulatory Sandbox for Robo Advice (EBI Working Paper Series
26/2018, 2018).
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well as other forms of interaction. Successes and challenges derived from such
approaches may provide fruitful insights into new emerging regulatory engagement models’.5
In this context, the paper tries to ascertain if sandboxes are consumer-friendly environments (Para V), in particular by analyzing the role that consumer issues play in the design and management of sandboxes. The paper takes
the EU legal landscape into account (Para II), as well as the CGAP and World
Bank survey of 2019 (Para III), and the UK Financial Conduct Authority regulatory sandbox (Para IV), with a focus on their impact on consumers. In the
authors’ view, the UK’s case is of particular interest as a case study, being
the first and most advanced FinTech regulatory sandbox – a truly pioneering
project.
Knowledge and application of this tool have spread since its debut in 2015,
so that currently we count more than 50 countries with a regulatory sandbox
in place.6 Regarding the European Union, as of January 2020, seven regulatory
sandboxes are in operation,7 with several more joining the fray sooner or later.8 For those that are active already, the competent authorities confirmed that
their regulatory sandboxes followed the statutory objectives of contributing to
financial stability, promoting confidence in the financial sector and protecting
consumers.9
The majority of the ongoing regulatory sandboxes operate in the FinTech
field, defined by the European Central Bank as ‘an umbrella term for any kind
of technological innovation used to support or provide financial services. It is
5
6

7

8

9

Financial Stability Board (FSB) (n 3).
A list of the active sandboxes is available in EBI Working Paper Series 2019 (No. 53), appendix A.Ross P Buckley and others, ‘Building FinTech Ecosystems: Regulatory Sandboxes,
Innovation Hubs and Beyond’; For the EU area, see European Supervisory Authorities,
FinTech: Regulatory Sandboxes and Innovation Hubs (University of New South Wales Law
Research Series, Report JC 2018 74, 2019) ¶ 2.2.
In the United Kingdom in May 2016 by the Financial Conduct Authority, in the Netherlands
in January 2017 by De Nederlandsche Bank in a joint initiative with the Autoriteit Financiële
Markten, in Denmark in October 2017 by Finanstilsynet, in Lithuania in September 2018 by
Lietuvos Bankas, in Poland in October 2018 by Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego, in Hungary in
January 2019 by Magyar Nemzeti Bank.
In Italy, a regulatory sandbox has been approved by Law 58/2019 and should be adopted by
the relevant Italian authorities (the Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance, consulting the
Bank of Italy, the National Commission for companies and the stock exchange, - CONSOB
and the Institute for Supervision on insurance - IVASS), within 180 days of the date of
entry into force of the law (30 June 2019). Further regulatory sandbox proposals have been
drafted or discussed, for example, in Austria, Estonia and Spain. In particular, on 18 February
2020, the Spanish Council of Ministers approved the Spanish Draft Bill for the Digital
Transformation of the Financial System, with the purpose of creating a Spanish ‘sandbox’.
European Supervisory Authorities, FinTech: Regulatory Sandboxes and Innovation Hubs
(Report JC 2018 74, 2019) 19.
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leading to many changes in the financial sector, giving rise to a range of new
business models, applications, processes and products. FinTech firms put technology-driven innovation at the core of their business. They may be particularly active in areas such as payment services, credit scoring and automated
investment advice, using artificial intelligence, big data or blockchain’.10
In the context of this article, we should note that the FinTech is a disruptive sector per definition, and that its companies’ innovations often come from
exploiting areas that are free from regulation.11
II. CONSUMERS’ PROTECTION AND REGULATORY
SANDBOXES IN THE EUROPEAN LANDSCAPE

A. Preparing the Field
The main objective of sandboxes is to provide a safe space to test innovative
products. More specifically, through a sandbox the regulator aims to promote
innovation by lowering regulatory barriers. A regulatory sandbox is therefore
a tightly defined safe space that automatically provides clearance from certain
regulatory requirements – provided that the applicants meet certain criteria. It
is important to understand to what extent the regulatory barriers can be lowered, and which pieces of regulation limit a State’s decisional autonomy in
this regard. Within this scenario, one could consider consumer protection as
one of the categories which can be damaged by the regulatory sandbox dimension, even if the majority of the adopted sandboxes provide for mechanisms to
ensure that consumers are not negatively affected.
Generally, regulators stress that regulatory sandboxes allow firms to test
innovative products, services and business models in a live market environment, while ensuring that appropriate safeguards are in place.12 These safeguards include consumer protection and they can come in different forms. One
example could be the limitation of the number of participants via tight entry
conditions, since it helps in keeping the surveillance manageable, and therefore
in avoiding a lax consumer protection.13
10

11

12

13

European Central Bank <https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/smexplained/html/
fintech.en.html> accessed 4 April 2020.
F. Di Porto and G. Ghidini, ‘“I Access Your Data, You Access Mine”: Requiring Data
Reciprocity in Payment Services’ (2020) 51 IIC, 307-329.
L. Bromberg, A. Godwin and I. Ramsay, ‘Fintech Sandboxes: Achieving a Balance between
Regulation and Innovation’ (2017) 28:4 Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice,
314-336.
D. Zetzsche, and others, ‘Regulating a Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart
Regulation’ (2017) 23 Fordham I. Corp. Finac. Law 31-103.
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Among these entry conditions, usually we see a requirement for the measure under test to have a beneficial effect for consumers. In addition, the time
limitation of the sandbox can be similarly interpreted. Furthermore, there are
several measures that can be implemented to specifically protect those customers who participate in sandbox testing. Indeed, once included in the sandbox, it
is vital that any consumer willing to test a product or a service is appropriately
protected, and this should apply regardless of whether retail or institutional
customers are involved.14 For example, in two jurisdictions (Denmark and the
UK) testing should be limited, pursuant to the testing plan, to consumers in
the local market.
The rationale for such restrictions is that, to the extent that testing within
the regulatory sandbox involves cross-border activity, an absence of any prior
coordination or interaction with the host authority could pose risks, for example, to compliance with local customer disclosure or with other consumer
protection requirements. Moreover, the competent authority scrutinizing the
sandbox test may not have sufficient proximity to monitor the testing outside
the jurisdiction. The authorities explained that the imposition of such a testing
parameter does not give rise to legal issues. Put simply, by agreeing to participate in the sandbox in accordance with the testing parameters set out by the
authority, the firm voluntarily agrees to carry out the test just with customers
of the local market.

B. Regulatory Sandboxes and the EU
Over the past several years, the European Commission has been pursuing
two strategic objectives that are of particular interest to the FinTech sector: the
establishment of a Digital Single Market,15 and the building of a capital markets union and of a true single market for consumer financial services.16 In
general, the EU Commission has been adapting EU rules with the rapid progress of technologies, and in particular with those that are causing structural
changes in the financial sector.17
In November 2016, the Commission set up an internal Task Force on
Financial Technology to address the potential opportunities and challenges
14

15

16
17

See, for example, the remarks of the EBA Banking Stakeholder Group in s 2.3 of the BSG’s
Report on Regulatory Sandboxes (July 2017) <https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/
files/documents/10180/807776/dc1d5046-e211-4b24-aadf-33fc93949017/ BSG%20Paper%20
on%20Regulatory%20Sandboxes_20%20July%202017.pdf?retry=1> accessed 20 April 2020.
Commission, ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ (Communication) COM (2015)
192 final.
Commission, ‘Building a Capital Markets Union’ COM (2015) 63 final.
Commission, ‘FinTech Action Plan: For a More Competitive and Innovative European
Financial Sector’ (Communication) COM (2018) 109 final.

6

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON CONSUMER LAW AND PRACTICE

VOL. 8

posed by FinTech. After a public consultation on FinTech in 2017, to gather
stakeholders’ views on the impact of new technologies on financial services,18
the Commission published a FinTech Action Plan.19 Furthermore, the European
Commission’s March 2018 FinTech Action Plan mandated the European
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) to carry out an analysis of innovation facilitators and to identify their best practices.
This resulted in the ESAs20 publishing a joint report on innovation facilitators (regulatory sandboxes and innovation hubs) in January 2019.21 The report
provides a comparative analysis of the innovation facilitators established to
date within the EU and suggests best practices for the design and operation of
innovation facilitators. In the opinion of the authors, a likely next step will be
the publication of a set of guidelines by the Commission on the organization
of the Member States’ regulatory sandboxes, the types of activities concerned,
and how the supervision should be conducted.22
Although there is little experience to support any decision on innovative financial services, it should be stressed that the EU remains steadfast in
its commitment to competition, consumer welfare and market stability.23 Such
objectives must underlie all activities that national regulators carry out with
innovative firms, including regulatory sandboxes. That is, the EU is willing to
encourage new regulatory approaches toward innovative firms as long as consumers remain protected and market dynamics undistorted.24 In this regard, the

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Commission, ‘FinTech: A More Competitive and Innovative European Financial Sector’
(Consultation Document, 16 March 2017). In particular, the consultation was structured along
four broad policy objectives that reflect the main opportunities and challenges related to
FinTech: (1) Fostering access to financial services for consumers and businesses; (2) Bringing
down operational costs and increasing efficiency for the industry; (3) Making the single market more competitive by lowering barriers to entry; and (4) Balancing greater data sharing and
transparency with privacy needs.
Commission, ‘FinTech: A More Competitive and Innovative European Financial Sector’
(Communication) COM (2018) 109 final.
In particular, pursuant to the mandate in the FinTech Action Plan and to art 9(4) of the founding regulation, each of the ESAs had to establish a committee on financial innovation bringing together all relevant competent national supervisory authorities with a view to achieving a
coordinated approach on the regulatory and supervisory treatment of new or innovative financial activities and providing advice to present to the European Parliament, the Council and the
Commission.
European Supervisory Authorities, FinTech: Regulatory Sandboxes and Innovation Hubs
(Report JC 2018 74, 2019).
Commission, ‘Frequently Asked Questions: Financial Technology (FinTech) Action Plan’
(Factsheet) MEMO/18/1406.
Commission, ‘Consumer Financial Services Action Plan: Better Products, More Choice’
(Communication) COM (2017) 139 final, 12.
Commission, ‘FinTech Action Plan: For a More Competitive and Innovative European
Financial Sector’ (Communication) COM (2018) 109 final, 3.
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first tool to reduce risks for consumers are the limitations imposed on regulatory sandboxes’ lifespan and number of clients that can be involved.
The FinTech Action Plan is entirely in line with this general approach. From
its introduction, it clarifies that even though European’s regulatory frameworks should allow firms that operate in the EU Single Market to benefit from
financial innovation and to provide their customers with the most suitable and
accessible products, these same frameworks should also ensure a high level of
protection for consumers and of market confidence.25
In other words, it is conceded that consumers might benefit from advancements of the financial sector – that could happen via regulatory sandboxes
activated in highly innovative sectors – but consumer protection should not be
compromised in any way by these operations. In this sense, Mariya Gabriel,
Commissioner for the Digital Economy and Society, commenting the FinTech
Action Plan, stated: ‘Digital technologies have an impact on our whole economy – citizens and businesses alike. (…) We need to build an enabling
framework to let innovation flourish, while managing risks and protecting consumers.’ (emphasis provided).26
For the scope of this article, then, the ESAs joint report provides an interesting read for understanding how potential risks could be managed and
consumers protected. This is linked to a matter of liability raised by some
competent authorities during the above-mentioned public consultation, ieon
their possible legal liability in the event of consumers suffering detriment
because of services received while participating in a sandbox.27
The risks for consumers are present mainly during the testing phase of
regulatory sandboxes, when the participating firms actually elaborate and test
their proposals. The ESAs clarified that the competent authority should verify
that applicants to regulatory sandboxes adopt the necessary measures to mitigate said risks. The ESAs also identified tools that, in theory, may reduce consumers’ risk exposure, identifying best practices based on existing regulatory
sandboxes.
First, firms taking part in a regulatory sandbox should be required to
provide appropriate disclosures to consumers, for them to have a clear
25

26

27

Commission, ‘FinTech Action Plan: For a More Competitive and Innovative European
Financial Sector’ (Communication) COM (2018) 109 final, 3.
Commission, ‘FinTech: Commission Takes Action for a More Competitive and Innovative
Financial Market’ (Press Release) IP/18/1403.
European Supervisory Authorities, FinTech: Regulatory Sandboxes and Innovation Hubs
(Report JC 2018 74, 2019), 35-6.
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understanding of the nature of the test and of all its relevant features. In discussing best practices, the ESAs specify that participating firms should clearly
disclose to potential consumers whether their services or products are provided
within a regulatory sandbox and what the implications for consumers are.28
In particular, participating firms should openly lay out how consumers will
be treated upon exiting the test environment, and they should include a provision for compensation or redress in case consumers suffer a loss during the
testing phase. As per the above-mentioned liability issue for competent authorities, the ESAs clarified that the disclosure may include a clarification that the
competent authority had no responsibility for the test, but that the authority
itself should consider the ongoing activities on a case-by-case basis and that
participating firms should not be allowed to communicate at any stage that the
competent authority endorsed their testing activity.29
Second, participants to a regulatory sandbox should have adopted appropriate measures to mitigate any potential risk from the test, and testing parameters may be imposed by the competent authority in this sense. In the opinion of
the Authors, the joint reading of this best practice with the overall report and
the FinTech Action Plan allows us to consider consumer protection safeguards
or consumer suitability tests as examples of testing procedures for mitigating
risks to consumers who interact with the participating firms during the sandbox. Furthermore, the competent authorities should always be allowed to end
the test if any detriment to consumers were to emerge.30
Therefore, the best practices described in the ESA’s report are aimed to
encourage applicants to employ regulatory sandboxes and to orient them when
it comes to consumers’ interests. However, applicants should carefully consider
how they will safeguard consumers while testing their product or service. In
this context, the ESAs identified the mentioned best practices but also noted
that appropriate additional measures would need to be identified on a case-bycase basis.
Finally, the ESAs provide us with a broad warning: regulatory
should not allow the dis-application of regulatory requirements
law. However, levers for proportionality in the application of said
requirements may be made available in the context of regulatory
28

29

30

sandboxes
under EU
regulatory
sandboxes

European Supervisory Authorities, FinTech: Regulatory Sandboxes and Innovation Hubs
(Report JC 2018 74, 2019), Annex B, 45-6.
Indeed, the competent authority should always be considered as the one monitoring the testing
in line with the parameters of the regulatory sandbox.
European Supervisory Authorities, FinTech: Regulatory Sandboxes and Innovation Hubs
(Report JC 2018 74, 2019), 19.
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and employed in the same way as for firms outside the sandbox. This best
practice is clear when it comes to the scenario where a firm needs to satisfy the requirements to obtain a license before providing certain financial
services.31
In this sense, the Payment Services Directive (PSD2)32 established an
exemption for small payments institutions33 and these could be exempted both
inside and outside a sandbox. However, the application of licit levers of proportionality within the sandbox could produce an indirect impact on consumers
interacting with the sandbox and on the competitive dynamics of the market.
While the EU legislator has carried out the specific balancing act within
PSD2, each regulatory sandbox must be activated and monitored by the competent local authorities, and ad hoc consumer and competition safeguards
should be established on a sandbox-by-sandbox basis.Lastly, in the Study on
Blockchain carried out for the European Commission,34 one can read that regulatory sandboxes would be valuable tools when it comes to blockchain use
cases. In this sense, it is recognized that initially the sandboxes were used in
the FinTech context mostly, but we should not exclude their employment in
other domains, as for example the British Information Commissioner’s Office
did.35
While discussing the role of regulatory sandboxes in the blockchain scenario, the Study published in 2020 stresses another positive aspect of sandboxes: they foster collaboration between innovators and regulators. In turn, this
ensures that while innovators can experiment with new technologies, regulators
31

32

33

34

35

European Supervisory Authorities, FinTech: Regulatory Sandboxes and Innovation Hubs
(Report JC 2018 74, 2019), Annex B, 46.
European Parliament and Council Directive (EU) 2015/2366 on Payment Services in the
Internal Market [2015] OJ L337/15 (PSD2 Directive).
Art 32 of PSD2 Directive: ‘1. Member States may exempt or allow their competent authorities
to exempt, natural or legal persons providing payment services as referred to in points (1) to
(6) of Annex I from the application of all or part of the procedure and conditions set out in ss
1, 2 and 3, with the exception of arts 14, 15, 22, 24, 25 and 26, where: (a) the monthly average
of the preceding 12 months’ total value of payment transactions executed by the person concerned, including any agent for which it assumes full responsibility, does not exceed a limit
set by the Member State but that, in any event, amounts to no more than EUR 3 million. That
requirement shall be assessed on the projected total amount of payment transactions in its
business plan, unless an adjustment to that plan is required by the competent authorities; and
(b) none of the natural persons responsible for the management or operation of the business
has been convicted of offences relating to money laundering or terrorist financing or other
financial crimes. (…)’.
Study on Blockchains, Legal, Governance and Interoperability Aspects (SMART 2018/0038)
111.
‘ICO Selects First Participants for Data Protection Sandbox’ (ICO, July 2019)<https://ico.org.
uk/about-the- ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2019/07/ico-selects-first-participants-for-data-protection-sandbox/> accessed 2 June 2020.
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are better able to determine early what changes are needed (if any). On the
other hand, the Study identifies the risk to consumer protection as one of the
main potential disadvantages of regulatory sandboxes. In this sense, the study
makes the point that sandboxes should be carefully designed from a consumer protection perspective, since consumers may be brought to believe that
the general consumer protection law applies in full, whereas the sandbox may
actually provide the participating company with some exemptions.36
III. THE JOINT STUDY OF CGAP AND WORLD BANK

The CGAP (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor) and World Bank study
(2019) offers some preliminary findings in understanding the relationship
between consumer protection and regulatory sandboxes. The survey was conducted between February and April 2019, with 62 financial sector regulators
inquired, 31 total responses collected (27 fully completed) and 28 countries
covered around the world. According to the study, sandboxes present the
opportunity for nascent FinTech firms and regulators to engage and build
mutually beneficial relationships at an early stage – enabling firms to better
understand the regulatory requirements they will face; and enabling the regulator to assess the firms’ characters and stay abreast of FinTech innovations.
According to the CGAP-WB study, almost 70 percent of the 23 surveyed
regulators dealing with sandboxes had put safeguards in place to ensure consumer protection. This applies to both the pre-contractual phase, by placing
information disclosure requirements, and the execution phase, by providing
consumers with mechanisms for handling complaints.
In particular, authorities require an appropriate disclosure with selected consumers of the firm during the testing phase. For example, in two jurisdictions
(Denmark and the UK) firms may be required to use standardized wording to
inform consumers from the outset that the firm is participating in a sandbox.
Denmark requires firms to include wording to clarify that the authority has
not endorsed the proposition, and to explain potential risks and the rights of
recourse against the firm should the consumer suffers detriment as a result of
the test. As for the testing parameters, a breach of the agreed communication
arrangements can result in the termination of the test, or in other enforcement
or supervisory action.
To be clear, participating firms should disclose to any consumers running
the test the fact that the services are being provided in the context of sandbox,
36

Study on Blockchains, Legal, Governance and Interoperability Aspects (SMART 2018/0038)
112.
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and what this implies for the consumers (e.g. in terms of measures to mitigate
risks from testing and on conditions for leaving the sandbox).
While 52 percent of the surveyed regulators do grant temporary waivers
from full consumer protection regimes, most respondents also require full
authorization at the end of testing.37

Source: CGAP-World Bank study (2019)

Interestingly, the CGAP-World Bank study (2019) helps to understand which
consumer services are sold to consumers within regulatory sandboxes. It confirms that companies innovating in payments services, especially those testing
crypto-based solutions, dominate sandboxes. About 30 percent of sandbox projects involve payments (including remittance or digital transaction accounts)
and nearly 30 percent deals with market infrastructure (exchanges, clearing and
settlement, escrow services) and wholesale financial services. Perhaps not surprisingly, blockchain and crypto-asset projects collectively make up almost 25
percent of projects accepted. These business models range from digital asset
exchanges to blockchain-enabled trade finance or to settlement infrastructure
for cross-border remittances.
37

S. Appaya and I. Jenik, CGAP-World Bank: Regulatory Sandbox Global Survey (July 2019)
<https://www.findevgateway.org/sites/default/files/publication_files/surevy_results_ppt_cgap_
wbg_final_20190722_f inal.pdf> accessed 20 April 2020.
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In addition, it appears that regulatory sandboxes do not properly address
poor consumers, usually. Indeed, most sandbox-tested innovations do not target excluded and underserved customers. Less than 25 percent of sandbox
tests focus on business models or technologies that explicitly address barriers
to financial inclusion or that address the financial needs of poor people. Aside
from certain sandboxes in Sierra Leone and Mozambique, only a handful of
sandbox tests — including NOW Money (Abu Dhabi and Bahrain sandboxes)
and Rahi Payment Systems (Rwanda) — overtly focus on projects for the
unbanked. Arguably, this number would be higher if we counted all services
that may be relevant also to the excluded and underserved, regardless of the
actual goals of the firms using sandboxes.
IV. THE PIONEERING PROJECT OF THE UK
FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY

In the authors’ view, the UK FCA sandbox38 deserves an in-depth analysis,
considering that it is truly a pioneer in the sector – in chronological order and
in terms of advancement.39 Indeed, the FCA is an uncontested leader when it
comes to the development of the sandbox structure for the efficient testing of
innovative financial products and services, and in its approach to consider consumers as protagonists.
As discussed, applicants to a regulatory sandbox must propose and adopt
appropriate measures to protect consumers and to restore them should they
suffer any detriment within the testing phase. All the competent authorities
supervising the active regulatory sandboxes in the EU agree that these ad hoc
measures represent a precondition for testing in a sandbox.40 Only the Financial
Conduct Authority (FCA) – competent for the UK sandbox – considered that
the regulatory sandbox should also follow the objective to promote effective
competition in the interests of consumers.41 In terms of consumer protection,
the FCA has indeed set a high bar with respect to the many various regulatory
sandbox frameworks that are now in place.
From the feasibility report published in November 2015, we can see that
the FCA’s objective was to promote effective competition in the interests of
38

39

40

41

Financial Conduct Authority, Regulatory Sandbox, Marginal No. 3.4 (2015) <https://www.fca.
org.uk/publication/research/regulatory-sandbox.pdf> accessed 20 April 2020.
See D.W. Arner, Janos Barberis and R.P. Buckley, ‘FinTech and RegTech in a Nutshell, and
the Future in a Sandbox’ (2017) 3(4) CFA Institute Research Foundation 1-16.
European Supervisory Authorities, FinTech: Regulatory Sandboxes and Innovation Hubs
(Report JC 2018 74, 2019) 19.
The statutory ‘competition’ objective; European Supervisory Authorities, FinTech: Regulatory
Sandboxes and Innovation Hubs (Report JC 2018 74, 2019) 19.
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consumers.42 The same report points out that the sandbox must enable the FCA
to cooperate with innovators to ensure that sufficient consumer protection safeguards are integrated into the new products and services before these reach a
mass-market.
Since the sandbox is intended for testing new solutions in real-life situations, the FCA considers any risk of consumer detriment very carefully, as well
as the need to respect legal rules. Within the acceptance criteria for joining –
and staying within – the sandbox the FCA specifically lists consumer benefits,
in the sense of offering a good prospect of identifiable benefits to consumers.
Therefore, from the start of the process, successful applicants for FCA
sandbox will have demonstrated that they have genuinely innovative solutions
which, inter alia, provide consumers with a clearly identifiable benefit, and
whose effects last for the overall duration of the sandbox.
In general terms, the FCA requires that the ‘type of customers has to be
appropriate to the tested products and to the exposed risks’.43 Consumer protection should always be granted on a case-by-case basis, but the FCA sets default
parameters that help to create licit trial environments, which are mainly the
following:
(a) Duration: Generally three to six months is adequate.
(b) Customers: The number of customers should be sufficient to generate
statistically relevant data. Customers should be selected according to
certain criteria that are appropriate for the product and service. In particular, ‘retail customers’ should not bear the risks of sandbox testing,
so they should always have the right to complain first to the company,
then to the Financial Ombudsman Service. And, in the event of company’s bankruptcy, they should have access to the Financial Services
Compensation Scheme (FSCS). It may also happen that the process
is limited to ‘sophisticated customers’ who have agreed to limit their
claim.
(c) Disclosure: Customers should be accurately informed of the test and
of available compensations (if necessary). In addition, the indicators,
benchmarks and milestones that are used during the testing phase
should be clear from the outset.
42
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FCA, Regulatory Sandbox Lessons Learned Report: Regulatory Sandbox (October 2017)
<www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatory-sandbox.pdf> accessed 20 April 2020.
FCA, Default Standards for Sandbox Testing Parameters [hereinafter ‘Default Standards’],
Customer Selection (2017) <https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/default-standards-forsandbox-testing- parameters.pdf> accessed 20 April 2020.
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Concluding the assessment of the FCA regulatory sandbox from a consumer perspective, we can distinguish four alternative approaches to protect
customers that take part to a sandbox testing phase: (i) participants should test
their new solutions only with customers who have given informed consent to
be included in testing and who are properly informed of potential risks and
available compensation; (ii) an appropriate disclosure, protection and compensation during the testing phase should be agreed with the FCA on a case-bycase basis; (iii) customers have the same rights of customers who engage with
other authorized firms; (iv) any loss to customers should be compensated by
sandbox participants and the latter should demonstrate to possess the necessary
resources.
The FCA expressed its preference for the second approach, since it enables
flexibility in setting appropriate customer protections for the testing activities.
Therefore, the case-by-case assessment of consumers’ safeguards – already discussed within the EU framework – finds balanced application within the FCA
sandbox.
Looking at the specific safeguards in favor of consumers, the FCA puts in
place a set of standard safeguards for all sandbox tests and develops additional safeguards where these are relevant. For example, it requires all firms
in the sandbox to develop an exit plan to ensure tests can be shut down at any
point whilst minimizing potential damages to participating consumers.44 These
safeguards also include extra capital requirements, systems penetration testing
and secondary review of robo-advice by a qualified financial adviser, among
others.45
V. REGULATORY SANDBOXES: BENEFITS
AND RISKS FOR CONSUMERS

It is acknowledged that consumers could benefit from progress in the financial sector, including from innovations brought about by regulatory sandboxes.
However, consumer welfare should not be undermined in any way by such
operations.46 The association of consumer associations in the EU (hereinafter:
‘BEUC’) has also considered them by noting that: ‘Sandboxes allow innovators
44
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FCA underlines, for example, that in many instances where firms were testing the use of digital currencies in money remittance, the authority required the firms to guarantee funds being
transmitted to deliver full refunds in the case of funds being lost. FCA discusses the cases of
Application Programme Interfaces (APIs), biometrics,
W-G Ringe and C. Ruof, ‘A Regulatory Sandbox for Robo Advice’ (2018) (European Banking
Institute Working Paper Series 2018, No. 26).
Commission, ‘FinTech: Commission Takes Action for a More Competitive and Innovative
Financial Market’ (Press Release) IP/18/1403.
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to trial new products, services and business models in a real-world environment, without some of the usual rules applying. Examples of sectors where
regulatory sandboxes have been established include the FinTech area and the
energy market’.47
Indeed, just recently legal scholars have started to discuss how consumer
law and policy should be redesigned in the wake of financial innovation.48
Recent findings raise the question as to whether sandboxes are living up to
their potential and whether their impact can be improved with a focus on consumers’ interests.49 For the scope of this article, the above mentioned ESAs’
joint report provides an interesting read for understanding how to manage risks
and protect consumers.50
With regard to consumer protection, the ESAs clarified that the competent
authority should verify that applicants to regulatory sandboxes adopt the necessary measures to mitigate risks for consumers, and that there are tools in place
for reducing consumers’ risk exposure. In this sense, the ESAs identified best
practices based on existing regulatory sandboxes and, at the same time, it clarified that appropriate measures would need to be identified on a case-by-case
basis.51
Moreover, as mentioned in paragraph III, a particular aspect of the ESAs’
report stands out: by analysing the safeguards of the different European regulatory sandboxes adopted in the FinTech, only the one of the UK Financial
Conduct Authority (FCA) explicitly lists the promotion of effective competition
in favour of consumers among its objectives.52 In the light of the above, we
can now draw some preliminary reflections on the interplay between regulatory
sandboxes and consumer protection in the EU.
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A. Benefits for Consumers
(a) New Players in the Field
New FinTech sandboxes may lead to more decentralization and diversification in financial services which may reduce market concentration and thus
give ‘more choice’ to consumers among big and small players and typologies
of services. In particular, we note that SMEs and, particularly, start-up companies may enter sandboxes to test their innovative services and, after, establish
themselves as new players in the field. At the same time, FinTech innovations,
when fruitfully tested in a sandbox, could promote the efficiency of the financial system by reducing costs and granting faster completion of transactions for
clients.

(b) Ex Ante Regulation v Ex Post Regulation
Regulatory sandboxes represent a quite innovative form of ex-ante regulation aimed at preventing risks for consumers in the emerging FinTech markets
for banking and financial services. By developing sandboxes, authorities are
trying to overcome the failures of traditional regulation, especially with respect
to banking and financial services.53 In our view, the shift towards testing and
prevention should be considered a positive development, especially if we consider that in the past the EU showed a tendency to overregulated with the goal
of safeguarding the internal market.
However, this approach does not represent a novelty in consumer protection where the EU acquis primarily concerns ex-ante regulation, including, for
example, mandatory pre-contractual information disclosure and right of withdrawal.54 The new approach may find a number of practical applications given
that the notion of FinTech includes a variety of different services, such as for
example, crowd funding and the application of technology to insurance contracts (‘InsurTech’), but also various market support services and technologies
applicable in multiple and different sectors - data management, aggregators of
financial data and services, comparison websites, artificial intelligence , big
data, cloud computing, distributed-ledger technology).55
53
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(c) Financial Inclusion
The FCA reports that the sandbox has enabled tests from firms with innovative business models that address the needs of consumers particularly at
risk of financial exclusion. The House of Lords Select Committee on Financial
Inclusion published a report in March 2017 that cited the FCA sandbox as an
incentive for FinTech solutions to deal with financial exclusion.56 Studies also
seem to confirm the potential of financial innovation with respect to consumer
banking and lending in the United States. The authors note: ‘(…) these innovations both hold the promise of reducing racial and ethnic disparities in lending and bring concerns that they may be exploited in ways that perpetuate
inequality’.57

B. Risks for Consumers
The paragraph explores a number of issues where regulatory sandboxes,
especially those concerning innovative banking and financial services, may
raise some concern in relation to consumer protection. The question is whether
the particular environment of sandboxes for innovative services poses new
risks to consumers. Accordingly, BEUC stresses: ‘consumers expect a level
of supervision that strikes the right balance between enabling innovation and
ensuring it poses no unacceptable risks to health, safety, security, the environment, or people’s values (eg democracy, right to privacy)’.58

(a) Data Protection
Regulatory sandboxes often include innovative financial services that use
data intensively.59 Innovation and experimentation in data mining and analytics, including in relation to personal data, are both defining characteristics
of FinTech and the backbone of its services. As with any data-intensive ecosystem, regulatory sandboxes carry security concerns for hacking and data
breaches, as well as – in banking– thefts of identity and of assets.
56
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The ever-growing appetite of the FinTech sector for data on consumer
behaviors and conditions also fuels some privacy concerns. We can easily
observe that banks and insurers are moving from a reliance on credit agencies
and volunteered information, towards mining social-media profiles, web-browsing, loyalty cards and phone-location trackers. Moreover, the Economist
reported that during a test FICO, the main US credit-scorer, found that words
used in his Facebook status could help predict his creditworthiness.60
Even facial expressions and voice tones are being studied for risk-analysis.
Facebook itself carried out experiments for gauging its users’ creditworthiness in 2016; these tests were abandoned in light of regulatory concerns. While
supporters of personal data mining argue that consumers benefit from personalized products and more tailored pricing, the potential for consumer detriment is significant. One may question whether new lending services based on
FinTech could actually increase financial exclusion: consumers might see them
as risky, and those lacking a digital footprint might be priced out. There is also
the possibility – especially in relation to insurance – that providers will make
consent to tracking a pre-condition for coverage.
The use of closed, proprietary algorithms could also lead to a situation
where consumers are denied access to a service (eg credit or insurance), based
on an inaccurate correlation and with no possibility of determining, let alone
correcting, the underlying assumptions. Beyond consumer privacy and financial inclusion concerns, scholars noted that, despite such approaches becoming
commonplace, the innovative use of data is still in its early days. Although a
wide range of experimentation is taking place, the actual robustness of the new
approaches is still unknown.61

(b) Price Discrimination
As noted above in relation to data, regulatory sandboxes allow financial services firms to gain insights into the circumstances and behaviors of consumers
and prospective consumers. This brings about the possibility that some providers may seek to offer services only to the most profitable, or the least risky,
segments and shut others out of the market. Specifically, in the UK, the FCA
has already expressed concerns that big data could exclude consumers that the
insurance market recognizes as too risky.
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economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/02/09/big-data-financial-services-and-privacy>
accessed 20 April 2020.
E.T. Tjin Tai (n 59).

2020

SANDBOXES & CONSUMER PROTECTION 19

The data practices outlined above can also give rise to price discrimination, where a provider offers incentives to its preferred segments and charges
premier rates to the rest. This practice would hamper comparisons and it risks
negating the benefits from an increase in choice and competition that were outlined above. The FCA points to instances of discrimination where, rather than
data mining leading to offers for consumers that tailored to their individual
behaviors, individuals were denied opportunities based on the actions of others.

(c) Complaints Handling Mechanisms
We also deem important to underline that if the test is terminated prematurely due to some issue that came up during the testing, the agreed exit plan
comes into effect. This may involve the discontinuation of the product or service under test, or the continuation outside the regulatory sandbox, or inside
the sandbox if a prolonged testing period is agreed. Importantly, the firm will
be required to implement measures to protect the interest of consumers (eg to
arrange for a smooth off-boarding of consumers, payment claims, etc) and, if
any detriment to consumer has occurred, to take as many remedial steps as
appropriate.
In addition, the competent authorities noted that, as a precondition for testing in a sandbox, an applicant must first prepare appropriate measures to
restore consumers in case they suffer any detriment in the course of the sandbox test. If a detriment does occur, then the authorities are entitled to end the
test.
VI. HOW INNOVATION AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION CO-EXIST IN THE SANDBOXES?

Regulators have reacted to FinTech according to four main strategies.62 The
first approach involves doing nothing or laissez-faire. The second approach
consists in approaching these innovations on a case-by-case basis. The third
strategy provides for the development of new regulations or the application of
the existing ones. The fourth approach (ie structured experimentalism) occurs
when the regulators can provide a structured piloting exercise, a regulatory
‘safe space’ for experimentation with new approaches involving the application of technology to finance. The case here discussed of regulatory sandboxes
fits perfectly in the fourth approach. Legal scholars and policymakers are just
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getting acquainted with regulatory sandboxes, but it is not clear whether the
impact consumers and how.63
Surely, traditional approaches to regulation may hinder innovation, especially in the new banking and financial services sector. This is often cited
among the reasons for the slow technological adoption in financial services, or
as an argument against the regulators’ activities and rules. For the purposes
of our paper, we note that together with the idea that innovation and regulation are intrinsically opposed against each other, there lies another assumption:
innovation cannot be a central part of a regulator’s mandate, as this would
amplify any risk stemming from new technologies and undermine the regulator’s duty to protect consumers.
Following this argument, regulators can hardly engage in innovation, nor
can they support or manage it, and often find their hands tied when faced with
the proliferation of ‘risky’ technologies – such as digital banks and payments,
artificial intelligence and block-chain. Given the breadth and variety of the
FinTech phenomenon and the issues mentioned above and since it is not possible to give a single regulatory response to the same, the EU deemed necessary
to examine the different articulations of FinTech, paying particular attention to
the functions performed, to the characteristics of the activity and of the risks
and of the protection needs.
This is in order to verify if it is possible to bring individual innovations
back into existing categories and assess whether the disciplines currently in
force are suitable for protecting the interests at stake or whether it is necessary
to make adjustments to them or, again, adopt ad hoc regulations or other new
approaches, such as the case here considered of regulatory sandbox. In this
sense, sandboxes are the best way to ensure consumer protection and to mitigate market risks, while also encouraging innovation, which serves the interest of the entire market, consumers included. For example, many firms propose
the application of new technologies to reduce operational costs from traditional
processes and favor consumers through lower prices.64
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Moreover, a key aspect of effective competition is that it drives useful
innovation, pushing firms to invest in the next generation of technologies to
improve their effectiveness on the market – thus increasing the same market’s
effectiveness. One may expect improvements in competition to deliver better value for consumers and other users of financial services. Our point here
is that regulators will be required to manage the tensions that arise from supporting innovation that complements their competition objectives, while at the
same time recognizing that some of those innovations will inevitably either
create new risks (iecryptocurrency manipulation), or shift existing risks into
the digital realm (ie financial criminal activity turns into financial cybercrime).65 One author noted, ‘Each type of collaboration presents certain risks or
governance issues to the consumers, the participating firms, and the financial
market as a whole, and hold different ramifications for the existing regulatory
regime’.66
VII. CONCLUSION

We are still riding on the long wave of the fourth industrial revolution,
which has overwhelmed boundaries (between services and products) and traditional categories (legal and economic). The financial sector is not immune to
these disruptions, and it experiences profound changes in terms of the subjects,
processes and services (unbundled), markets (disinter-mediated), models (marketplace model) and relationships (no longer fiduciary). In such a complex and
evolving picture, the impact of regulatory sandboxes for consumer protection is
still uncertain. Yet, as the preceding sections have shown, it is already reshaping large financial services markets in ways that deliver benefits for consumers,
but that can also magnify existing risks and detriments, as well as introduce
new ones. Some of these risks and detriments are already becoming apparent.
Others will emerge as innovative banking and financial services become
more widespread, or as innovations further transform what the market offers.
Beyond the reports mentioned here, we should notice that evidence on the
impact of regulatory sandboxes remains scarce. In particular, proof of sandbox-driven regulatory change is weak. Indeed, there is little evidence that
sandbox programs have generated formal regulatory change or modernization.
Of course, the impact from sandbox programs may be occurring at a more
informal level (eg, by helping regulators to reconsider the interpretation of
existing rules), or it may actually be too early for any considerable effect to
65
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manifest itself.67 Put it differently, innovation is not an end in itself, nor is it
always beneficial for consumers. For innovation to be consumer-driven, policy
makers and academics must pay greater attention to consumer concerns, needs
and expectations.68
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